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Do People Really Become More Conservative
as They Age?
Johnathan C. Peterson, Palo Alto College
Kevin B. Smith, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
John R. Hibbing, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Folk wisdom has long held that people become more politically conservative as they grow older, although several
empirical studies suggest political attitudes are stable across time. Using data from the Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study, we analyze attitudinal change over a major portion of the adult life span. We document changes
in party identiﬁcation, self-reported ideology, and selected issue positions over this time period and place these changes
in context by comparing them with contemporaneous national averages. Consistent with previous research but contrary to folk wisdom, our results indicate that political attitudes are remarkably stable over the long term. In contrast to
previous research, however, we also ﬁnd support for folk wisdom: on those occasions when political attitudes do shift
across the life span, liberals are more likely to become conservatives than conservatives are to become liberals, suggesting that folk wisdom has some empirical basis even as it overstates the degree of change.

O

ne of the most widespread generalizations among
social scientists and the lay public is that people become more conservative as they grow older (Glenn
1974). This belief is captured in the well-known aphorism that
“if you are not a liberal at 20 you have no heart and if you are
not a conservative at 30 you have no brain,” variants of which
date from at least the time of the French Revolution. Voting
patterns seem to conﬁrm the relationship between aging and
conservativism. For example, exit polls suggest just 37% of 18–
29-year-old voters cast a ballot for Donald Trump in the 2016
presidential election, compared to 43% of 30–44-year-old voters and 53% of those over 45. Despite the broad acceptance
of this folk wisdom, in the scholarly literature the theoretical
foundations linking aging to shifts in political attitudes are somewhat inconsistent, and empirical support is, at best, mixed.
Our goal in this article is to examine the theoretical models for
expecting aging to lead to a more conservative political orientation and to provide a robust empirical test of this relationship.

THEORY AND LITERATURE
Why is aging so often expected to produce a conservative
shift? Aspects of aging include psychological aging, physio-

logical aging, social aging, biological aging, economic aging,
and aging in and of itself. A theoretical basis for expecting a
rightward drift in political views can be constructed from
nearly all of these. Psychological and physiological age-related
changes, for example, include increasing self-discipline, preference for order, uncertainty avoidance, the capacity to remember emotionally laden stimuli, and alterations in neural
structures (Dennis et al. 2008; Jost et al. 2007; St. Jacques,
Dolcos, and Cabeza 2009). All of these can plausibly be connected to personality characteristics, such as greater conscientiousness and diminished openness to new experiences,
frequently associated with conservatism (Gerber et al. 2010;
Mondak 2010; Soto et al. 2011; Srivastava et al. 2003). Such
psychological and personality changes could lead to endorsement of more authoritarian and traditional values and norms
(Cornelis et al. 2009) and perhaps even higher levels of prejudice (Henry and Sears 2009).
Social aging refers to changes in patterns of social interactions across the life course. From the twenties to the ﬁfties,
social patterns are often dominated by increasing familial
connections, while retirement from the workforce in the
sixties may be accompanied by a rapid decline in overall
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social interactions. These sorts of changes in social opportunities and obligations could affect values and approaches to
life that are related to politics. For example, evidence suggests
that people in middle age care more about their work, their
responsibilities, and their family, and these tendencies may
direct attention toward more immediate, personal concerns
(Angel and Settersten 2012; Srivastava et al. 2003). Such a
growing focus on immediate, personal matters could facilitate a pattern consistent with folk wisdom, as middle-aged
individuals lose some of the idealism that might have been
present before the assumption of family and work responsibilities (Glenn 1974).
Changes in economic status also frequently accompany
aging. Financial resources tend to grow with time spent in the
workforce and accumulate as a career gathers momentum.
An increase in resources during the movement into middle
age might lead some to develop greater appreciation for a
stable, predictable, secure society and also to embrace laissezfaire stances on taxation and redistribution (Angel and Settersten 2012). Retirement can also bring a shift in economic
status, a change that may have important implications for
political attitudes and behavior. For example, there is good
evidence that the importance of Social Security to the ﬁnancial well-being of senior citizens is an important motivator of their political attitudes and actions (Campbell 2002).
Biological aging occurs throughout the life course, and we
already mentioned the gradual shifts in neural functioning
that could be connected to conservatizing tendencies. But,
major and often rapid late-in-life changes like health declines
can dramatically affect lifestyle and motility (Sears 1981).
Unlike the other effects of aging we have discussed, serious
health needs may shift some political views to the left. Although we do not know of any empirical evidence on this
point, as health deteriorates in advanced years the need for
assistance from others, including the government, increases
and could lead to support for interventionist, redistributive
health care policies.
Yet another aspect of aging is simply the passage of the
years themselves. Even if an individual’s psychological, social,
economic, and health situations were somehow to remain
constant, the fact remains that every year brings more experiences. This means that each subsequent event is mathematically an inevitably smaller proportion of the summation
of life’s previously accumulated experiences. As a result, the
passage of the years may bring what appears to be a greater
reluctance to change in light of new events and a greater weddedness to what has come before (Glenn 1974).
In sum, aging brings a complicated web of changes, but
theoretical reasoning and previous scholarship suggests that
on balance aging can be expected to push many toward the
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political right. However, there are reasons to be cautious
about overgeneralizing aging’s impact on political drift. First,
individual variation in the components of the aging process is
enormous. For example, certainly not all people see their ﬁnancial status improve as their lives unfold. Second, linearity
should not be assumed; as mentioned above, social connections and exposures tend to increase into middle age but then
decrease after retirement with similar patterns possible for
ﬁnancial status as well as other variables (see Danigelis, Hardy,
and Cutler 2007). Third, the case for expecting a conservative
shift is not equally strong with regard to all categories of political issues, making it possible for the results of aging to be
different for stances on social as opposed to economic issues.
The most important reason for caution, however, may be
that two very different conceptualizations of conservatism
can be found in the literature on politics and aging. The ﬁrst is
the classic Burkean formulation entailing active endorsement
of policies designed to promote the existing social order. This
means favoring policies supporting that social order and
countering threats to it by norm violators and out-groups.
The second meaning of conservatism is less concerned with
the substantive policy positions than the degree to which an
individual clings to beliefs. Reluctance to change is a distinct
view of conservatism in that it suggests someone who settles
into increasingly inﬂexible left-of-center stances is also demonstrating conservatism in a certain sense of the word (for a
discussion of these two aspects of conservatism, see Jost et al.
[2003]). Depending on which conceptualization of conservatism is being employed, quite different answers regarding
the aging-conservatism connection may be produced.
To add to the confusion, empirical work on the relationship between aging and political orientations varies depending on disciplinary focus. Political scientists have largely explored the degree of stability of political attitudes with only
minimal attention to the direction of any movement that does
occur (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Jennings and
Markus 1984). Scholars in sociology, psychology, and gerontology, however, have been more interested in the direction
of movement—that is, in whether people generally move toward more conservative postures (e.g., Cornelis et al. 2009;
Danigelis et al. 2007).
Turning ﬁrst to the political science literature, at least ﬁve
prevailing theories are in evidence. The lifelong persistence
model, derived primarily from the work of Campbell et al.
(1960), suggests that political attitudes result from socialization early in life and then persist throughout the life span
despite new political shocks and information. Although primarily applied to party identiﬁcation, the lifelong persistence
model also provides testable hypotheses for issue attitude
change and related concepts.
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The impressionable years model argues that young adults,
roughly between the ages of 18 and 26, are susceptible to attitudinal change but that thereafter attitudes crystallize and
become increasingly immune to new information as the years
go on (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Alwin and Krosnick
1991; Jennings and Markus 1984; Jennings and Niemi 1981;
Markus 1979; Newcomb 1943; Newcomb et al. 1967; Niemi
and Jennings 1991; Sears and Funk 1999; Stoker and Jennings
2008). In sum, the impressionable years model suggests that
people are pliable in early adulthood but relatively stable after
that (Dinas 2013).
Other models allow for the possibility of more change
throughout the life span. The party loyalty model holds that
individuals have no stable or ﬁxed opinions separate from
their partisan loyalty. In other words, this model implies that
after controlling for party identiﬁcation, attitudes are correlated as if individuals were expressing issue positions more or
less at random (see Achen and Bartels 2016; Page and Shapiro
1992; Zaller 1992).
The lifelong openness model suggests that attitudes remain
equally responsive to new information and events throughout the life span. This model is most succinctly presented by
Franklin and Jackson (1983) and Franklin (1984) who found
that partisan identiﬁcation was responsive to the ever-changing
policy orientations of the Democratic and Republican parties.
Presumably, the direction of the change would depend on the
nature of the evolving political environment.
The running tally model is a rational choice approach to
political learning primarily developed by Fiorina (1981) and
expanded on by Achen (2002) and Gerber and Green (1998).
This approach suggests that people routinely update their
attitudes on the basis of retrospective (Fiorina 1981; Gerber
and Green 1998) or prospective (Achen 2002) evaluations of
the political environment. Similar to the lifelong openness
model, the running tally model allows for attitudes to ﬂuctuate throughout the life span. Contrary to the lifelong openness model, the running tally model accords a large role to
prior attitudes, and they are expected to continue to be factored into constantly accumulating “tallies.”
An interesting feature of all the models in the political
science literature is that none are directional. In other words,
none of them directly addresses the veracity of the claim that
a conservative shift accompanies aging, except in the sense
that no signiﬁcant aging-related conservative shift is possible
if orientations are completely stable through the years (lifelong persistence) or largely stable after an early and ephemeral
period of ﬂux (impressionable years). To put it another way,
none of these models predicts or expects an inherent bias
toward conservative rather than liberal change. In this sense
the political science literature tends to focus on the degree

rather than the direction of change, with most of the results
pointing toward a substantial amount of stability as aging
occurs.
In contrast, on the basis of the changes accompanying
aging, the literature in other disciplines displays signiﬁcantly
greater interest in the direction of change, with the common
expectation and ﬁnding being that for a variety of politically
relevant issues the direction of change observed will be toward the right rather than the left (see Cornelis et al. 2009;
Franssen, Dhont, and Van Hiel 2013; Kossowska, Jaśko, and
Bar-Tal 2012; Tilley and Evans 2014; Van Hiel and Brebels
2011; Wilson 1973; although see Schwadel and Garneau
2014). As such, these results seem to support folk wisdom.
In summary, the existing literature exhibits no shortage
of theoretical models linking aging to political attitudes.
Broadly speaking, those models focus on direction or stability (but not both) and have discordant expectations. Direction focused theoretical frameworks, mainly developed
outside political science, generally (but not uniformly) suggest that various aspects of the aging process (psychological
aging, economic aging, etc.) support conventional wisdom in
predicting a rightward drift over the life span. The bulk of
stability focused models developed in political science argue
for long-term stasis in political attitudes or at least partisanship throughout adulthood (lifelong persistence, impressionable years, party loyalty), although there are clearly counterarguments for instability (lifelong openness, running tally).
What might a coherent combination of all these disparate theoretical arguments look like? A reasonable synthesis is a model
that predicts a general stability in political attitudes, at least
once out of early adulthood, but allows for change and predicts
that any such change is more likely to move in a conservative
rather than a liberal direction. Such a synthesis clearly captures the dominant theoretical arguments relating to direction, while also incorporating political science work arguing
for stability.
This model suggests a set of straightforward hypotheses:
(1) Political attitudes will remain relatively stable across adulthood. (2) Over the long term, any change in attitudes that does
occur will more likely be to the political right rather than the
political left. Finding these patterns would support our synthesized model. To the best of our knowledge, these hypotheses have never been simultaneously tested. If an empirical analysis fails to support either hypothesis—that is, if attitudes
are unstable and move equally in both directions—it would
suggest two of the models championed in political science
(lifelong openness, running tally) are the stronger theoretical
accounts of the link between aging and political attitudes. A
clear move to the left would constitute an empirical result with
very little theoretical basis.

Volume 82

THE CHALLENGES OF THEORY TESTING
A huge obstacle to empirically assessing the relationship between aging and political attitudes is data availability. Ideally,
testing hypotheses on aging and political orientations requires
a data set containing longitudinal information on political
views across the adult lifetime for many people in many different cohorts. Yet long-term longitudinal data sets for even a
single cohort are rare, which is undoubtedly why most research
has used cross-sectional data (Cornelis et al. 2009; Danigelis
et al. 2007; Franssen et al. 2013; Glenn 1974; Grant et al. 2001;
Kossowska et al. 2012; Schwadel and Garneau 2014; Searing,
Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976; Van Hiel and Brebels 2011).
The problem with using cross-sectional data is that they
are obviously ill equipped to identify life-cycle effects. Just
because older people are more conservative than younger
people at any given time does not mean that people have
become more conservative as they age. After all, many factors
other than the process of aging could account for persistent
positive cross-sectional correlations between age and conservatism. Perhaps liberals tend to pass away at a younger age
than conservatives. Perhaps liberals are more likely to quit
answering survey requests as they get older. Perhaps society
itself became more liberal over time (for evidence that this
may indeed be the case, see Schwadel and Garneau [2014]),
making it appear as though individuals themselves changed
when in fact individuals were largely static while the world
evolved around them. Or perhaps over-time changes occurred in a third variable (e.g., increases in mean years of
education and especially in college attendance) that is related
both to political beliefs and to age, which then might give the
impression of growing conservatism when it is really just the
case that the older people in a cross-section were less likely to
have, say, extended education. In short, standard crosssectional data confound aging effects with period effects (for
a thorough discussion of these and related issues, see Firebaugh [1997] and Yang and Land [2013]).
In the absence of longitudinal data, several scholars have
turned to synthetic or constructed cohort analysis (e.g., Alwin
1994). Advantages accrue to such an approach, but it typically
relies on the assumption that the only causes of attitudinal
change within a cohort are the result of intracohort aging/
learning and not attrition from the cohort (Danigelis et al. 2007).
The assumption of no attrition would be less concerning except
for recent evidence of systematic differences in mortality rates
for liberals and conservatives (see Pabayo, Kawachi, and Muennig 2015; Subramanian, Huijts, and Perkins 2009; Subramanian et al. 2010). So while cohort analyses have provided many
useful insights, authoritatively adjudicating between life cycle
and either generational or period effects requires real longitudinal data, preferably spanning several decades.
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This reality has led some scholars to turn toward data that
follow individuals across major portions of their lives. Such
data are still not perfect because any given cohort may not be
typical, meaning that results could have been much different
with a cohort from an earlier or later time period. Still, the
ability to see changes in a given cohort at multiple life stages is
a real advantage and makes it possible to document political
changes over the course of a lifetime for that cohort at least.
One problem is that few data sets measure political beliefs for
the same people during periods of time longer than a few
years. To be more speciﬁc, as far as we are aware, only three
publicly accessible, long-term longitudinal data sets contain
the information necessary to assess the degree and nature of
political change over the course of a signiﬁcant portion of the
life span: the Bennington Study, the Terman Study, and the
Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (MSS).
The Bennington Study began as an investigation of attitude change among approximately 500 students attending
Bennington (VT) College—at that time an all-female institution—in the late 1930s. In 1960, 350 of the Bennington
women were reinterviewed to see whether the changes had
persisted and then, in 1984, when most of the women were in
their late sixties, 266 again were reinterviewed. The items
posed in these interviews included nine dealing with speciﬁc
social and economic issue attitudes (for a valuable summary,
see Alwin et al. [1991]).
The Terman Study began in the early 1920s when Stanford
psychologist Lewis Terman identiﬁed and tested approximately 1,500 intellectually gifted high school students. Mail
questionnaires were completed by an impressive number of
the original participants in 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1977. Political information—usually only party identiﬁcation and selfreported ideology—was not contained in the original data
collection, so the useful period covered is approximately
37 years, from about the time participants were in their early
thirties until when they were approximately 70 years of age
(for more details, see Sears and Funk [1999]).
The dominant analytic approach in this literature correlates
an individual’s attitudes in previous waves with attitudes in
subsequent waves, using either standard correlations, continuity
coefﬁcients, or test-retest statistics (see, e.g., Jennings, Stoker,
and Bowers 2009; Sears and Funk 1999). The central ﬁnding
with regard to the effects of aging on political orientations is that
a signiﬁcant amount of stability in views is present.
Although variants of continuity coefﬁcients are perfectly
appropriate if the topic of interest is persistence, they only
afford indications of the degree of change (in other words, of
the extent to which views at, e.g., age 25 correlate with the
same person’s views at age 40). Surprisingly little attention in
political science has been given to the direction of change as
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opposed to the degree of change (for a brief exception, see
Sears and Funk [1999], 10). We should note in passing that
some scholars have been interested in the distinct but related
matter of changes in levels of political participation and
interest (see, e.g., Green and Shachar 2000; Walsh, Jennings,
and Stoker 2004). When, as is the case in this article, the
focus is on political preferences, the main area of scholarly
concern has tended to be on changes in party identiﬁcation,
with ideology and individual issues getting much briefer
attention. Stoker and Jennings (2008), for example, focused
on changes over time in the link between party identiﬁcation
and issue positions, and Sears and Funk (1999) analyzed
changes in issue salience.
The sample characteristics for both of these longitudinal
data sets (females attending an exclusive college in the Northeast and extremely gifted high school students in California)
urge caution when generalizing. Given the atypical nature of
these two samples, we were attracted to the third longitudinal
data set: the MSS. These data have been described in great detail
in other work (see Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings et al.
2005) and afford a unique opportunity to study attitudinal
change. The MSS was initiated by surveying 1,669 high school
seniors and their parents in 1965. (We should note that, since in
the mid-1960s many students would have dropped out of high
school before their senior year, even this sample is certainly not
perfectly representative.) The study then reinterviewed those
same people in 1973, 1982, and then again in 1997, when the
researchers not only returned to the original youth cohort but
also interviewed their children. We focus here on the individuals who were high school seniors in 1965 since they provided
the most complete information, although even here data are not
available across the entire time span of the survey. For example, ideological self-identiﬁcation was not asked in 1965,
although it was in the other three waves.
A total of 935 of the original respondents were reinterviewed in the ﬁnal, mid-1997 wave, an impressive retention
rate of 56% from the original pool. In 1997 about half of the
interviews were face to face and half by telephone, while the
data from the three prior waves were mostly collected through
face-to-face interviews. All interviews were conducted by the
Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan (see
Jennings et al. [2009] for more details). The nature of this data
set provides advantages for studying change in political orientations. These data are truly longitudinal and cover the years of
life from ages 18 to approximately 50, making it possible to
examine sources of attitudinal change over the course of an
important and lengthy segment of the adult life span—a segment that includes the alleged change from idealistic 20-yearolds to coldly rational 30-year-olds that is the basis for so
much folk wisdom and scholarly analysis. Still, we readily
admit that these data do not provide insight into changes in

political orientations during later stages of the life cycle.
These changes are undeniably important and should not be
assumed to be merely a continuation of the nature and direction of changes occurring earlier.
As noted above, our operational theory combines the
emphases of the political science tradition stressing stability in
political beliefs across the life span with the tradition apparent
in other disciplines stressing the existence of a conservative
shift with age. We assert that stability in views will be quite
common. This expectation is consistent with long-standing
ﬁndings in political science, going back at least to Converse,
as well as with more psychologically and biologically based
assertions that people have relatively stable, politically relevant predispositions that are difﬁcult but not impossible to
change (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014). At the same time,
our theory recognizes that not everyone remains perfectly
stable. Previous work on the nature of aging is convincing in
suggesting that, for psychological and other reasons, pressure
toward the political right will be greater than toward the left.
Therefore, we expect that on those occasions when stability is
not in evidence individuals will be signiﬁcantly more likely to
become more conservative than more liberal.
To put it differently, consistent with a substantial amount
of political science research, we predict that most people’s
political orientations in early adulthood will be accurate predictors of their orientations at least until late middle age but,
consistent with folk wisdom and research in other disciplines,
we expect that the movement occurring will not be balanced.
Aging does entail conservatizing tendencies; it is just that these
tendencies are usually not powerful enough to override inertial
forces. As such, our model combines the known persistence of
political beliefs with the conservatizing pressures believed to
accompany the aging process (e.g., Sears and Funk 1999; Sears
and Valentino 1997).
Testing these expectations could facilitate important advances in theoretical understanding of the nature and sources
of political orientations. If a shift to the right with aging is
detected, it would suggest that the next step for researchers
will be sorting through each of the many features of aging that
could be the reason for the conservatizing pattern. If, however,
aging does not bring a shift to the right, this would suggest that
the substantial theoretical bases for expecting such a relationship need to be reconsidered. What are the actual consequences of aging for the two conceptualizations of conservatism—over-time stability in beliefs and embracing Burkean
issue positions? Looking at this question from a cross-sectional
perspective is useful, but observing key variables unfold throughout the course of actual lives holds the promise of providing
more revealing answers.
Moreover, the evidence is strong that on a range of important issues, such as attitudes toward the death penalty and
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corporal punishment as well as tolerance for interracial marriage, females in nontraditional roles, and gay rights (Schwadel
and Garneau 2014), public opinion as a whole has become
more liberal in recent decades even as at any given point older
people tend to have more conservative positions than younger
people on these issues. What will happen if society’s shift to
the left on selected issues does not continue? If it is the aging
process that produces conservatism, older people will continue
to be more conservative than their younger colleagues. If, however, older people have not become more conservative with
age but rather have merely continued to hold the beliefs they
did when they were 20 years old—beliefs that decades later
might appear to be conservative—then the apparent conservatizing effects of age would be misleading, and older people
would no longer appear to be more conservative. The question becomes whether, if society’s drift to the left stopped,
older people would eventually cease being more conservative
than young people. We propose to determine whether the
apparent tendency of aging to shift political beliefs to the right
is largely due to the practice of confusing the effects of aging
with the effects of age.

AGGREGATE RESULTS
For our purposes, the key limitation of the MSS data is that
only a few political items were posed to the student cohort,
and several of them offered very limited response options or
were posed only in selected waves. The only seven-point item
included in 1965 was party identiﬁcation (1 p strong Democrat; 7 p strong Republican). Six additional seven-point
items were posed in all of the waves except 1965: selfreported ideological identiﬁcation (1 p liberal; 7 p conservative), attitude toward government assistance to minorities
(1 p in favor; 7 p opposed), attitude toward equality
for women (1 p in favor; 7 p opposed), attitude toward
marijuana legalization (1 p in favor; 7 p opposed), attitude
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toward jobs guaranteed by the government (1 p in favor; 7 p
opposed), and attitude toward the rights of the accused (1 p
in favor; 7 p opposed). Table 1 presents mean attitudes on
all these measures for every time point they were assessed in
the MSS. Reading these means from left to right within each
row thus tracks how the average score on each trait’s sevenpoint scale changed across time in the MSS sample. Table 1
also reports difference-of-means tests (two-tailed t-tests) indicating whether these attitudes showed any statistically signiﬁcant change (p ! :05) between time points. For example,
in the ﬁrst row of table 1, we see a statistically signiﬁcant
difference between party ID in 1982 and 1973 and between
1997 and 1982.
At ﬁrst blush, the MSS data seem to provide support for the
belief that people tend to become more conservative with age.
Reading across rows we see that six of the seven variables
available for analysis shift signiﬁcantly to the right as this
cohort ages from 26 to 50 (and from 18 to 50 in the case of
party identiﬁcation, the one variable for which readings were
taken in 1965). The one exception is attitudes toward equality
for women that became signiﬁcantly more favorable from
age 26 in 1973 to age 50 in 1997 (a shift to the left of 1.05; for an
explanation of why this issue may be different from the other
variables, see Levendusky [2009]). Typical movement to the
right on the six variables is around a half point on the sevenpoint scales, with a range from .35 on legalizing marijuana to
.92 for providing rights for the accused.
In all cases the lion’s share of this movement came between
age 26 and 35 (i.e., from 1973 to 1982) rather than from age 35
to 50 (from 1982 to 1997). In fact, the only items for which
there was a statistically signiﬁcant shift to the right from age
35 to 50 was for party identiﬁcation and self-reported ideological labels, and the substantive movement in these cases
was modest (.15 for party identiﬁcation and .10 for ideology).
From age 35 to 50, the MSS cohort did not become signiﬁcantly

Table 1. Political Attitudes across Time: MSS Subjects, 1965–97
1965
Variable
Party ID
Ideology
Minority assistance
Role of women
Rights of accused
Guaranteed jobs
Marijuana legalization

1973

Mean

N

3.48
...
...
...
...
...
...

925
...
...
...
...
...
...

Mean
3.57
3.78
3.80
2.99
3.42
4.35
4.07

1982

1997

N

Mean

N

Mean

N

929
816
900
919
884
858
911

3.81*
4.23*
4.49*
2.20*
4.44*
4.86*
4.42*

907
826
908
923
901
878
888

3.96*
4.33*
4.52
1.94*
4.34*
4.78
4.42

922
905
927
927
912
893
908

Note. All variables are on a 1 (most liberal position) to 7 (most conservative) scale. MSS p Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study.
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference (p ! .05, two-tailed t-test) from previous time point.
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more conservative on any of the ﬁve substantive seven-point
issues included in the surveys. Indeed, in this time period they
became slightly more liberal on the role of women and rights
of the accused. The fact that the overall drift toward conservatism is evident only between 1973 and 1982 raises the distinct possibility that this shift may be attributable to period
rather than aging effects. For example, the 1982 reading took
place in the context of the Reagan era when America seemed
to be shifting to the right—although it is also the case that
1982 was not a particularly good year for Republicans: they lost
27 House seats in the midterm elections and, owing largely to a
recession, President Reagan’s popularity had dropped to 40%.
Be this as it may, the larger issue is that longitudinal data
with a single cohort cannot separate aging from period effects
(Firebaugh 1997; O’Brien 2011; Yang and Land 2013). Is the
pattern of results presented in table 1 due to a universal rhythm
of aging, or is it due to something unusual surrounding the
period of time analyzed? In order to provide a partial answer to
this question, we compare the MSS results with information on
the changing climate of the times. More speciﬁcally, we present
the attitudes of the MSS cohort alongside of the results of each
of the American National Election Study (ANES) surveys

conducted closest in time to the MSS data collection points,
thereby making it possible to examine the degree to which the
aging of the MSS sample is or is not consistent with mean
attitudes of the country at about the same time when the MSS
soundings were taken. We are able to perform this analysis for
four of the measures included in table 1: party identiﬁcation,
ideological identiﬁcation, attitudes on women’s rights, and
attitudes on minority assistance. The other three issues in table
1 did not have equivalent ANES seven-point items included at
the necessary time points.
In panel A of table 2, we compare the mean attitudes for
the MSS cohort (see table 1) with the mean for all ANES
participants in the appropriate year. This practice makes it
easier to parse age and period effects given that the full ANES
data set allows us to establish the general change in attitudes
across American society during the relevant timeframe. If
MSS attitudes over the years merely move in sync with the full
ANES data, it would be difﬁcult to claim an independent effect for aging. If, however, they shift to the right more rapidly
than does the national mood (as represented by the full ANES
sample), the case that conservative orientations increase with
aging is enhanced.

Table 2. Political Attitudes across Time: MSS/ANES Comparisons
Party ID
Year

MSS

Ideology

ANES

MSS

Minority Assistance

ANES

MSS

Women’s Equality

ANES

MSS

ANES

...
4.24*
4.41
4.82*

...
2.99
2.20
1.94

...
3.51*
2.86*
2.24*

...
3.79
4.36
4.78*

...
2.99
2.20
1.94

...
3.07
2.56*
2.02

...
3.79
4.27
4.72

...
2.99
2.20
1.94

...
3.07
2.56*
2.01

A: ANES entire sample
1965
1973
1982
1997

3.48
3.57
3.81
3.96

3.26*
3.62
3.46*
3.68*

...
3.78
4.23
4.33

...
4.14*
4.32
4.33

...
3.80
4.49
4.52

B: ANES, age 21–29 (1974), age 33–41 (1982), age 45–53 (1996)
1965
1973
1982
1997

3.48
3.57
3.81
3.96

3.18*
3.62
3.38*
3.70

...
3.78
4.23
4.33

...
3.79
4.14
4.31

...
3.80
4.49
4.52

C: ANES, age 21–29 always
1965
1973
1982
1997

3.48
3.57
3.81
3.96

3.18*
3.62
3.53*
3.60*

...
3.78
4.23
4.33

...
3.79
4.21
3.98*

...
3.80
4.49
4.52

Note. All variables are on a 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative) scale. MSS p Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study. ANES p American
National Election Study.
* Statistically signiﬁcant difference (p ! .05, two-tailed t-test) between samples at same time point.
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The pattern for each of the four available variables is
somewhat different. With regard to party identiﬁcation, the
MSS sample was consistently more Republican than the
nation as a whole, but the gap does not appear to change
much over the decades: in 1965, the MSS sample was .22
more Republican than the ANES sample, and in 1997 it was
.28 more Republican, so there is little evidence of an agerelated rightward shift in relative party identiﬁcation. The
case for such a shift is marginally better for ideological selfreport. In 1973, when the MSS cohort was 26, it was significantly more liberal than the nation as a whole (3.78 to 4.14);
by 1997, when the cohort was 50, it was no longer more (or
less) liberal than the nation as a whole (4.33 to 4.33). Similar
modest shifts to the right, relative to the national mood,
occur for the two issue positions for which data are available.
In 1973, the MSS sample was .44 more liberal than the full
ANES sample on the issue of minority assistance; 24 years
later it was only .30 more liberal. Similarly, the shift toward
more liberal stances on women’s equality between 1973 and
1997 was slightly less pronounced for the (aging) MSS
sample (a drop of 1.05 from 2.99 to 1.94) than for the country
as a whole (a drop of 1.27 from 3.51 to 2.24).
Looking across the four available measures in panel A of
table 2, evidence for a conservatizing shift attributable to aging
is modest. The aging of the MSS sample was accompanied by
conservative shifts that were slightly greater (or in the case of
attitudes toward women’s equality, by liberal shifts that were
slightly less) than movements for the country as a whole.
Differences in movement between the age-affected and ageunaffected samples, however, are typically only about .2 or .3
on a scale of 1–7.
We employed other variants of ANES data to provide
baselines against which to compare attitudes of the MSS
cohort, and we present them in panels B and C of table 2. The
ﬁrst (panel B) identiﬁes those in the ANES data set who were
in the same age cohort as the MSS cohort at any given time.
To be more speciﬁc, in panel B we compare the familiar MSS
results not with the full ANES sample, as we did in panel A,
but rather with only those ANES respondents who were
between the ages of 21 and 29 in the 1974 ANES survey, 33
and 41 in the 1982 ANES survey, and 45 and 53 in the 1996
ANES survey. As such, these particular ANES respondents
should reﬂect the age bracket into which the MSS respondents fell at each data point. Including this set of data has two
advantages. First, it provides a validity check on the MSS
cohort data (a large divergence between the two data sets
might suggest an issue with the external validity of the MSS
data). Second, differences in patterns of change between
these two data sets could indicate generational effects. On the
whole, the results look good for the MSS sample. Although
occasionally (for four of the 13 pairs) signiﬁcantly different
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from the comparable ANES age group at a comparable time,
these differences are substantively quite modest and are as
likely to be in a liberal as a conservative direction. More to
the point, this comparison does little to strengthen the evidence of a connection between aging and conservatism.
In panel C of table 2, we compare the MSS cohort with
only the ANES respondents who were 21–29 years old, regardless of the survey year. Thus, as we move from 1973 to
1982 to 1997 the MSS sample becomes ever older than the
baseline 21–29-year-old ANES subset, a situation that could
provide some additional information on the effects of aging.
If conservatizing movements are being driven by aging, the
gap between the MSS sample and the ANES “forever-young”
subset should increase in the later data points (1982 and
especially 1997) as the age gap grows.
As it turns out, this pattern is really only evident for
ideological self-report for which no differences in the samples
exist in either 1973 or 1982, but by 1997, when the MSS
sample is 50 and the ANES subset is still in their twenties, the
MSS cohort is signiﬁcantly more conservative. For the other
three variables, there is little change in the gap present in the
early readings and the gap present in 1997.1

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL RESULTS
Aggregated statistics can be misleading even when presented
in the context of control groups, so we next examine individuallevel patterns of change. In the interest of space, we do so only
for one central variable of interest—ideological self-labeling—
which was the lone variable for which it appeared that a slight
conservatizing tendency was present. We broke the seven-point
scale of ideology into a three-point scale where liberals, including weak liberals, were one category, moderates were another category, and conservatives, including weak conservatives,
were yet another category. We did this to make it possible to
identify people who changed their ideological label from 1973 to
1997 as opposed to those who stayed the same (or moved in
1982 and came home in 1997). The results are broken down
according to whether respondents in 1973 identiﬁed as liberals,
moderates, or conservatives. They are presented in table 3.
At least for ideology, the results seem to comport with our
expectations that stability is the norm but that when movement does occur it will usually be in a conservative direction.
Forty-four percent of liberals stayed liberal, 48% of moderates
stayed moderate, and fully two-thirds of conservatives stayed
conservative over the course of a quarter century, so stability
is common. When movement does occur with age, the bias is
toward a more conservative ideological posture. This is apparent both in moderates, where those moderates who did
1. Results comparing the MSS cohort to ANES respondents who attended
college can be found in table A.1 (tables A.1 and A.2 are available online).
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Table 3. Individual-Level Change in Self-Reported Ideology between 1973 and 1997: MSS Cohort
No Change

Liberals
Moderates
Conservatives
Total

Shifted to Moderate

Shifted to Liberal

Shifted to Conservative

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

44
48
67
51

145
184
149
478

22
...
14
11

72
...
32
104

...
13
19
10

...
49
43
92

34
39
...
28

113
148
...
261

Note. Cohort changing or shifting self-reported ideological categories between 1973 and 1997. Total N p 935.

change were three times more likely to become conservatives
than to become liberals, as well as in the imbalance of ideological movement for liberals and conservatives: 34% of liberals at age 26 were conservatives at 50, but only 19% of conservatives at 26 were liberals at 50.

GROWTH-MIXTURE MODELING RESULTS
The previous section did not permit much in the way of systematic analysis of the nature of individual variation, focused
only on one variable (self-reported ideology), and did not leverage model ﬁtting. Therefore, we now use growth-mixture
modeling (GMM)—a more sophisticated technique—to
examine patterns of change across several of the political variables contained in the MSS data set. GMM allows for the identiﬁcation of latent classes based on patterns found in repeated
measures (Ram and Grimm 2009). As each of the items was
measured repeatedly in the MSS, it is possible to use GMM to
identify patterns regarding both attitude stability and the direction of individual-level attitudinal change.
Although GMM can be an exploratory exercise, we take a
conﬁrmatory analytical approach. We begin with the assumption that there are ﬁve general patterns of change possible,
although the ﬁrst three patterns actually are patterns of stability; namely, some people will start off conservative and remain conservative, some people will start off moderate and
remain moderate, and some people will start off liberal and
remain liberal. The next two are patterns of lability: people
who change in a conservative direction, and people who
change in a liberal direction. Essentially, what we did with the
GMM is treat these as ﬁve latent classes for each item, then
tested to see whether models with fewer latent classes better ﬁt
the data. Speciﬁcally, we constrained the model to ﬁve latent
classes for each item, and then we used the Vuong-Lo-MendellRubin likelihood ratio test to decide whether the model was a
better ﬁt than a model with one less class. If the model was a
better ﬁt than the K 2 1 model (p ! :05), we then selected that
model. If the model was not a better ﬁt, we then ran the K 2 1
model to see whether the four-class model ﬁt better than a

three-class model. We continued this process until we found a
model with a better ﬁt than the model with one less class. We
ran the analyses with MPlus version 7.1 (Muthén and Muthén
2017).
Table 4 reports the estimates of the proportion of the MSS
cohort that falls into each category in the best ﬁtting model.
So, to take the case of the guaranteed jobs item, what table 4
shows is that the best ﬁtting model consisted of two categories:
people who maintained a conservative viewpoint on this issue
(about 77.5% of the cohort) and people who moved in a liberal
direction on this issue (22.5%). While there is some variation
from item to item, the overall pattern that emerges is that
stability is more dominant than lability, with any shift more
likely to be in a conservative direction. For example, on selfreported ideology (the ﬁrst row of table 4), roughly threequarters of the MSS cohort is estimated to remain stable
across the time span studied. Of the roughly 25% that did
shift, about 21% moved in a conservative direction and only
4% in a liberal direction (the issue of guaranteed jobs is the big
exception). In other words, the best ﬁtting model suggests that
if you started out conservative you stayed conservative (25%),
if you started liberal you stayed liberal (16.5%), and if you
started a moderate you stayed a moderate (33%).
On average, roughly 75% of the MSS cohort exhibited
stable attitudes across the seven items we were able to analyze (bottom row of table 4). Among those whose attitudes
did shift, they were more than twice as likely to move in a
conservative direction (17.4%) as opposed to a liberal (7%)
direction. In sum, the more rigorous statistical analysis of
individual-level patterns conﬁrms the general aggregate patterns reported in table 3.2

CONCLUSION
As a young man, George Babbitt, the eponymous protagonist
of Sinclair Lewis’s 1922 novel Babbitt, temporarily embraced a
2. The latent class means and slopes for each issue attitude are
reported in table A.2.
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Table 4. Issue Attitudes: Growth-Mixture Models
Issue
Ideology
Party ID
Guaranteed jobs
Legalized marijuana
Minority assistance
Protect rights of the accused
Women’s role
Average

Stay Conservative

Stay Liberal

Stay Moderate

Move Conservative

Move Liberal

p

.25309
.32956
.77479
.36019
.61130
.21677
...
.36367

.16506
.45187
...
.24432
.21684
.17006
.68521
.27619

.33012
...
...
.30570
...
...
.17241
.11546

.21458
.17327
...
.08974
.13841
.54491
.06118
.17458

.03714
.04530
.22521
...
.03345
.06826
.08120
.07008

.0294
!.001
!.001
!.001
!.001
.0449
!.001
...

Note. Proportion of the sample classiﬁed into each latent class. Empty cells indicate the group was not represented in the best ﬁtting model. The p-values are
derived from the Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test, with p ! .05 meaning the model ﬁt better than a model with one less latent class (K 2 1).

nonconformist, socially liberal lifestyle that included dabbling
in leftist politics. After some time, Babbitt gravitated toward a
more conservative life with an appropriately conservative wife
and friends. Although initially Lewis’s ﬁctional account seems
consistent with the “people become more conservative with
age” folk tenet, there is more to the story. Babbitt was bred,
born, and raised in a conservative, conformity-driven midwestern world. His conservatism did indeed waver for a time
in early adulthood, but it could be said that, rather than being
marked by a gradual migration to conservatism, in terms of
political orientation and social lifestyle, Babbitt went out
much as he came into adulthood—with only an ephemeral
dalliance in between.
This general pattern of consistency with occasional, mild
conservatizing tendencies on those fairly rare instances when
stability is not complete summarizes the results of our more
systematic investigation into political change over the course
of a lifetime. Our use of the most representative long-term
longitudinal political data set available, attention to the direction of change, comparison with ANES baseline groups,
and application of GMM allow us to make a modest but
important emendation to both folk wisdom and previous
scholarly work.
Of course, important caveats apply to this study. Most
obviously, although the MSS is an incredible resource, it has
full readings from just one cohort (18-year-olds in 1965) and
partial readings from a second. Might these results have been
different if they had been based on a cohort that did not come
of age in the middle of the tumultuous 1960s? Information on
a wider range of issue attitudes might also lead to different
conclusion. In addition, change could well occur after age 50,
subsequent to when the ﬁnal wave of the MSS occurred for the
student cohort. We certainly cannot rule out any possibilities,
and, therefore, caution should be employed before generalizing these ﬁndings. The nearly contemporaneous ANES re-

sults we present provide important historical context but are
no substitute for multiple longitudinal data sets covering the
entirety of adulthood—but hoping for such data sets to magically spring into existence is beyond fanciful. We are thankful for those longitudinal data that are available.
We ﬁnd some evidence of age-driven movement toward
the right for ideological self-report. Any apparent conservatizing movement by the (aging) MSS cohort for party identiﬁcation and for attitudes toward minority assistance was
largely accounted for by changes in the national mood, and
attitudes toward the role of women became more liberal with
increasing age. Lacking ANES data on attitudes toward rights
of the accused, guaranteed jobs, and the legalization of marijuana, we do not know whether the MSS cohort’s movement
to the right on these issues between ages 26 and 35 was also
matched by societal changes, although the fact that this shift
did not continue from ages 35 to 50 suggests that this may well
be the case. But, tables 3 and 4 show that, of those who shifted
ideologies, many more moved toward conservatism than liberalism. Given that the variable that changes most with aging
is not party identiﬁcation or substantive issue stances but
rather ideological self-labeling, one intriguing possibility is that
aging may increase the likelihood of identifying as a conservative more than it leads people actually to be conservative
(this might help explain, for example, why attitudes on the role
of women moved leftward while overall ideological selfidentiﬁcation moved in the opposite direction). Scholars have
known for some time that Americans tend to self-report being
conservative even as many simultaneously endorse liberal issue positions (e.g., Ellis and Stimson 2012). We know of no
evidence that the disjunction between operational and selfreported ideology increases with age, but our results suggest
there may be value in pursuing this possibility.
If those who are not liberal at 20 have no hearts and those
who are not conservative at 30 have no brains, there are many
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people in this world without either hearts or brains. The
nature of attitudinal change through the life span is more
nuanced than conventional wisdom and previous scholarship
suggests. Whether it is because of genetics (e.g., Alford, Funk,
and Hibbing 2005), powerful early socialization (e.g., Easton
and Dennis 1980; Hess and Torney 1967), or the impressionable nature of late adolescence and early adulthood (e.g.,
Alwin et al. 1991), we ﬁnd that existing political science research is correct in emphasizing the stability of political orientations over the course of the life span. Acknowledgment of
this stability, however, should not be so complete as to blind
us to the fact that, as is so often the case, folk wisdom contains
a glimmer of truth.
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APPENDIX

Table A.1 Political Attitudes Across Time: MSS/ANES Comparison (ANES COLLEGE ONLY)

Year
1965
1973
1982
1997

MSS
3.48
3.57
3.81
3.96

Party ID
ANES
3.97*
4.14*
3.85
4.08

MSS
-3.78
4.23
4.33

Ideology
ANES
-3.97*
4.11
4.17 (p =
.0523)

Minority Assistance
MSS
ANES
--3.80
3.74
4.49
4.02*
4.52
4.65

Women’s Equality
MSS
ANES
--2.99
2.65*
2.20
2.18
1.94
1.92

*Statistically significant difference (p < .05, two-tailed t-test) between samples at same time point
All variables are on a 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative) scale
MSS=Michigan Youth Parent Socialization Study
ANES=American National Election Study, subjects who attended college

Table A.2: Issue Attitudes Latent Class Means and Slopes
Issue Attitude
& Latent Class
Ideology SC
Ideology SL
Ideology SM
Ideology MC
Ideology ML
PID SC
PID SL
PID MC
PID ML
Jobs SC
Jobs ML
Marijuana SC
Marijuana SL
Marijuana SM
Marijuana MC
Minority Asst.
SC
Minority Asst.
SL
Minority Asst.
MC
Minority Asst.
ML
Accused
Rights SC
Accused
Rights SL
Accused
Rights MC
Accused
Rights ML
Women’s Role
SL
Women’s Role
SM
Women’s Role
MC
Women’s Role
ML

Mean (s.e.) at p-value
Time 1
Mean
5.05 (.297)
<.001
2.56 (.122)
<.001
3.85 (.107)
<.001
3.42 (.215)
<.001
4.90 (.242)
<.001
4.90 (.117)
<.001
2.72 (.08)
<.001
1.96 (.18)
<.001
6.13 (.339)
<.001
4.45 (.08)
<.001
4.85 (.218)
<.001
6.72 (.032)
<.001
1.29 (.04)
<.001
3.90 (.052)
<.001
1.60 (.115)
<.001
4.73 (.126)
<.001

of Slope (s.e.)

-.023 (.048)
.052 (.04)
.789 (.105)
-.894 (.100)
.197 (.03)
-.138 (.017)
.984 (.052)
-.895 (.10)
.299 (.038)
-.592 (.083)
-.529 (.042)
.514 (.049)
.270 (.046)
1.537 (.102)
.084 (.059)

p-value
Slope
<.001
.63
.19
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

.207 (.062)

2.68 (.192)

<.001

.136 (.075)

.07

3.00 (.20)

<.001

.967 (.111)

<.001

5.34 (.344)

<.001

-1.079 (.272)

<.001

5.43 (.156)

<.001

.057 (.066)

.39

2.33 (.174)

<.001

-.020 (.08)

.80

3.11 (.226)

<.001

.677 (.105)

<.001

5.20 (.299)

<.001

-.921 (.191)

<.001

2.06 (.076)

<.001

-.308 (.026)

<.001

3.66 (.162)

<.001

-.020 (.063)

.75

4.05 (.547)

<.001

.547 (.110)

<.001

5.14 (.211)

<.001

-1.43 (.095)

<.001

of

Scales for all items range from 1-7. Standard errors are in parentheses. Positive slopes indicate
change in a conservative direction. Negative slopes indicate change in a liberal direction.

